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ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes an ongoing debate within the U.S. government 
about the legal status of thousands of boxes of documents U.S. forces seized 
from the regime of Manuel Noriega in 1989 that remain in U.S. military 
custody.  The ongoing legal and diplomatic deliberations center on two 
questions: under both the law of armed conflict and U.S. records laws, (1) 
who owns these seized documents and (2) what should be done with them?  
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Wartime seizures of foreign government documents raise unique issues of 
ownership given that “enemy” documents can be a source of intelligence 
information, while also forming a part of the administrative, historical, and 
cultural heritage of a nation.  This Article argues that given the nature of 
the U.S. intervention in Panama, the U.S. government should treat the 
seized documents as Panamanian property under both international and 
U.S. law.  The Noriega regime documents are also crucial for ongoing 
human rights work focused on unresolved cases of missing and disappeared 
persons.  This Article concludes that the United States should offer to 
repatriate the documents to Panama for the benefit of human rights 
researchers, historians, and attorneys on both sides of current legal 
proceedings arising out of Noriega’s return to Panama in late 2011. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2011, a French court granted the extradition of General 
Manuel Noriega back to Panama after serving more than twenty years in 
prisons in the United States and France for drug trafficking.1  The return of 
Noriega forces Panama to revisit a crucial and painful part of its history and 
the unresolved fate of a central part of that history: thousands of boxes of 
Noriega regime documents that U.S. forces seized during “Operation Just 
Cause” in 1989.  After years of uncertainty about the location and status of 
the seized documents, the U.S. government confirmed to the author in late 
2011 that they are still in U.S. Army custody.2 
The United States initially treated the seized documents as “on loan” 
from the government of Panama and asserted repeatedly during Noriega’s 
U.S. criminal case that the U.S. government had agreed to return them to 
Panama as soon as possible.3  Beginning in 1993, however, when the 
United States was prepared to transfer custody of the documents, the 
government of Panama reportedly was reluctant to receive them due to the 
sensitivity of their content.4  Specifically, the documents include dossiers 
on Panamanian citizens compiled by the Noriega regime.5  At some point in 
 
1  Tracy Wilkinson, An Extradited Noriega Returns to Panama, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/11/world/la-fg-noriega-panama-20111212. 
2  Douglas Cox, Op-Ed, The Noriega File, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2011, at A15, available 
at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/05/opinion/la-oe-cox-noriega-20111005. 
3  See Memorandum from James W. Moore, Assistant Archivist for Records Admin., 
Nat’l Archives and Records Admin., to Archivist of the U.S. (July 3, 1995), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/795.pdf (noting that the U.S. Army “takes the position that the 
original documents are on loan from the Government of Panama”) [hereinafter July 1995 
Moore Memo]. 
4  See Andres Oppenheimer, Political Hot Potato Sits in Panama Warehouse, MIAMI 
HERALD, Jan. 17, 1993, at A25 (stating that Panama would not seek to recover “up to 15,000 
boxes of secret documents seized by U.S. troops”). 
5  Id. While the exact coverage of the documents is unclear from public sources, they 
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the mid-1990s, the United States transferred over 9000 boxes of the 
documents from Panama to a military warehouse in Albany, Georgia, where 
they remain today.6 
In 2001, the Panama Truth Commission sought access to the records to 
assist in investigating human rights abuses during the Noriega regime and 
the fate of missing or disappeared persons.7  After multiple requests for 
assistance, the U.S. State Department ultimately rejected the Commission’s 
requests for access.8  The documents were thereafter largely forgotten, even 
within the U.S. government, until they were essentially rediscovered in 
2010, when archivists found references to them in Defense Intelligence 
Agency (“DIA”) records.9 
This Article explores the complex legal status of the Noriega regime files 
seized by the United States.  Part II describes the seizure and exploitation of 
the documents during Operation Just Cause and their subsequent fate.  Part 
III assesses the current legal status of the documents in light of the law of 
armed conflict, U.S. federal records laws, and the complex question of 
whether the documents are currently the property of the United States, 
Panama, General Noriega, or some combination of the three.  Part IV 
argues that the United States should follow earlier precedents by offering 
the original documents to Panama and that the Panamanian government 
should accept this offer and take responsibility for its own history.  With 
originals in Panama and a copy in the U.S. National Archives, access to, 
and accountability for, the documents will maximize the benefit to 
historians, human rights researchers, families of victims, and attorneys on 
both sides of current legal proceedings related to the Noriega regime. 
II.  THE ODYSSEY OF THE NORIEGA FILES 
On December 20, 1989, U.S. forces began the assault against the Noriega 
 
may also include a significant number of records predating the Noriega regime. 
6  See Memorandum from Richard Rayburn, Nat’l Archives and Records Admin., to 
Sam Welch, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., “Captured Records from Operation Just 
Cause (Invasion of Panama) (Dec. 16, 2010) available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/1210.pdf (describing site visit to seized Panamanian records in 
military storage in Albany, Georgia) [hereinafter Rayburn Memo]. 
7  Truth Commission: Panama, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, 
http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-panama-truth-commission-comisi-n-de-
la-verdad-de-panam (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (noting how the Commission “. . . was 
mandated to investigate human rights violations . . .” that took place under Noriega’s 
dictatorship). 
8  COMISION DE LA VERDAD, INFORME FINAL DE LA COMISION DE LA VERDAD 6 (2002).  
An English translation of the Panama Truth Commission’s discussion of the seized records 
by Joan Shnier is available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/ptctrans.pdf. 
9  See infra Part II.C. 
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regime codenamed Operation Just Cause.10  The operation involved almost 
26,000 U.S. troops and resulted in the surrender of General Noriega on 
January 3, 1990.11  The United States justified the military intervention on 
several grounds, including that the “illegitimate Panamanian National 
Assembly,” at the “instigation of Manuel Noriega,” had “declared that a 
state of war existed between the Republic of Panama and the United 
States.”12  The United States also stated that the military action was “an 
exercise of the right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter” and was necessary “to protect American lives in imminent 
danger and to fulfill our responsibilities under the Panama Canal 
Treaties.”13 
A. Seizure & Exploitation 
During the course of U.S. operations in Panama, the U.S. military seized 
significant quantities of documents from installations of Noriega’s 
Panamanian Defense Forces, including its massive headquarters called the 
Commandancia, Noriega’s offices, and government facilities throughout 
Panama.14  A 1990 U.S. Army study attributed the “sheer volume of 
documents retrieved and turned in for exploitation” to the fact that initially 
“there were not priorities on locations to be searched or on what to look 
for,” which was “compounded by a shortage of interrogators, multiple 
exploitation priorities, and widely dispersed locations of large volumes of 
documents.”15 
The exact quantity of documents seized has been reported in various, and 
sometimes inconsistent, ways.  The 1990 U.S. Army study, for example, 
stated that within the “first week” of Operation Just Cause, “it was 
 
10  Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore 
of the Senate on U.S. Military Action in Panama (Dec. 21, 1989), in 2 PUB. PAPERS, at 1734  
[hereinafter President Bush Letter to Speaker].  For an extensive account of the invasion, see 
generally THOMAS DONNELLY, MARGARET ROTH & CALEB BAKER, OPERATION JUST CAUSE: 
THE STORMING OF PANAMA (1991). 
11  R. CODY PHILLIPS, OPERATION JUST CAUSE: THE INCURSION INTO PANAMA 42, 44 
(2004). 
12  President Bush Letter to Speaker, supra note 10. 
13  Id. On December 20, 1989, the United Nations General Assembly condemned “the 
intervention in Panama” by U.S. forces and stated that it constituted “a flagrant violation of 
international law.”  G.A. Res. 44/240, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/240 (Dec. 29, 1989). 
14   See, e.g., Cox, supra note 2 (“During the U.S. invasion of Panama to remove 
Noriega from office, American forces seized 15,000 boxes of documents from Noriega’s 
offices and the Panamanian Defense Forces.”). 
15  Document Exploitation, in 3 OPERATION JUST CAUSE LESSONS LEARNED: 
INTELLIGENCE, LOGISTICS, AND EQUIPMENT, BULLETIN NO. 90-9 (1990), available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/90-9/9093ch1.htm. 
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estimated that over 120 tons of documents had been captured.”16  On the 
other hand, a January 1990 memorandum from the DIA on the document 
exploitation effort stated that the “collected material is expected to approach 
50 tons.”17  Various news reports cited fifteen thousand boxes of 
documents.18  The current volume of the original seized documents in U.S. 
custody is measured variously as 9,131 boxes,19 approximately six million 
documents,20 or some four thousand cubic feet of records.21 
The January 1990 DIA memorandum described the wide variety of 
material seized noting: 
The exploitation team has reviewed a considerable amount of personal 
correspondence, bank statements/transfers, travel records indicating 
shipment of illegal aliens, arms inventories, policy letters, stolen U.S. 
documents, personal checking accounts, election ballots, letters to and 
from commercial firms, PDF G-2 reports on enemies of the 
government, and other like material.22 
Documents of human rights value are listed in an index to the records.23  
The materials include videotapes, which could contain interrogations and 
torture.24  Seized documents also include “routine government records from 
 
16  Id. 
17  Memorandum from Def. Intelligence Agency for the Deputy Nat’l Sec. Advisor to 
the President, Nat’l Sec. Council (Jan. 2, 1990) (on file at George H.W. Bush Presidential 
Library), available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/panama/diareport.pdf [hereinafter 1990 DIA 
Memo]. 
18  See, e.g., John Otis, Panama Gets Control of Noriega Documents, UNITED PRESS 
INT’L, Aug. 10, 1990 (citing “about 15,000 boxes of documents captured by U.S. troops”); 
Oppenheimer, supra note 5 (referring to “up to 15,000 boxes of secret documents seized by 
U.S. troops”). 
19  Memorandum from Douglas J. Feith, Under Sec’y of Def., to Sec’y of the Army  
(Aug. 1, 2001), available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/801.pdf (describing “over six 
million pages of Panamanian documents” that are “stored in 9,131 boxes”) [hereinafter Feith 
Memo]. 
20  Id.; see also July 1995 Moore Memo, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that the seized 
material comprises approximately six million documents). 
21  Rayburn Memo, supra note 6, at 1. 
22  1990 DIA Memo, supra note 17, at 1. 
23  Some examples from this index include: “Pictures of Morrison, Wendell’s tortured 
body. Information on Medrano,” “Info collected on the assassination of Panamanian 
President Remon, Jose Antonio and Miro, Ruben,” and “files on suspected subversives.”  
Memorandum from Dir., Foreign Military Studies Office (Aug. 13, 2001), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/fmso.pdf (quoting an index to the documents) [hereinafter 2001 
FMSO Memo]. 
24  See the summary contained in “August 9: Operation Just Cause Records Phone 
Call,” which documents a teleconference between the State Department and the U.S. Army 
from August 2011, available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/811.pdf [hereinafter 2011 State 
Dep’t/U.S. Army Teleconference]. 
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such places as the Panamanian passport office, Social Security Office, and 
the Panamanian equivalent of the Department of Motor Vehicles.”25 
Given the uncertain circumstances of the military seizure during the 
hostilities and the presumed sensitive nature of the content of the records, 
controversies over the integrity of the documents in U.S. custody began 
almost immediately.  According to one account: 
Army intelligence officials said they became concerned the day 
following the invasion when CIA personnel told members of the 
Army’s [470th] Military Intelligence Brigade to vacate the building.  
Some suspected the CIA agents cleared the building so that they could 
rummage through the files before anyone else knew what was there or 
what was missing.26 
In criminal proceedings against Noriega, which began almost 
immediately after his capture, criminal defense attorneys also asserted 
publicly “it was likely that American intelligence agencies had ‘sanitized’ 
the documents of embarrassing material.”27  Further, there were concerns 
that the military intelligence unit that initially controlled the documents 
may have been a questionable custodian of the records because of its earlier 
relationship with Noriega.28  A New York Times article cited a “senior State 
Department official” as stating that there “was deep concern” in the 
government that certain governmental entities, including “the Army’s 470th 
Military Intelligence unit that operated in Panama, may have involved itself 
 
25  Government’s Motion to Return Seized Documents to Government of Panama at 2, 
United States v. Noriega, (S.D. Fla. May 21, 1991) (No. 88-cr-79), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/591.pdf. Partial inventories of the seized documents, which 
were publicly filed in Noriega’s criminal case, provide more detailed samples of the 
material. See Douglas Cox, Inventories of Captured Panama/Noriega Documents, 
DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.docexblog.com/2011/12/inventories-
of-captured-panamanoriega.html. 
26  STEVE ALBERT, THE CASE AGAINST THE GENERAL: MANUEL NORIEGA AND THE 
POLITICS OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 100 (1993). 
27  James LeMoyne, A Thin Paper Trail in Noriega Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1990. 
There had been earlier document preservation issues involving the case against Noriega.  An 
informant had reportedly provided a box worth of documents to the U.S. Embassy in Panama 
in 1988 that supposedly showed connections between Noriega and drug trafficking and 
money laundering.  When the documents were sent to federal investigators in Miami, 
however, the sealed box had been opened and documents were reportedly missing.  DRUGS, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY: PANAMA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Terrorism, Narcotics & Int’l Operations, 100th Cong. 93 (1988); see also ALBERT, supra 
note 26, at 100-01. 
28  See, e.g., LeMoyne, supra note 27 (“American officials say they have used former 
members of the Panamanian Army to help identify and organize some documents. Some 
Panamanian officials have called that a risky step that could allow former military officials 
to tamper with evidence.”). 
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in illegal operations with General Noriega.”29 
Concerns about the integrity of the captured documents were 
compounded by reports that U.S. investigators were utilizing former 
members of Noriega’s Panamanian Defense Forces “to help identify and 
organize” some of the documents.30  Panamanian officials criticized this as 
a “risky step.”31  A Panamanian investigator argued that this practice was 
like “letting the mouse guard the cheese,” as “[t]hese are exactly the same 
people who must be investigated.”32 
While Justice Department officials involved in Noriega’s criminal case 
reportedly asserted that they had been “given access to all documents, 
which are under the control of the United States Army,” according to news 
reports, when pushed, officials from the Pentagon, State Department, and 
Justice Department nevertheless acknowledged that “it was possible some 
documents were destroyed or removed during the chaotic first days of the 
invasion.”33 
Given such considerations, in January 1990, Noriega’s defense attorneys 
filed an emergency motion for an order prohibiting the U.S. Attorney “or 
any other branch or agency of the United States Government from 
destroying any items seized from or belonging to” Noriega.34  The motion 
was granted on January 23, 1990.35  This was quickly followed by a motion 
for return of “stolen property” that accused the U.S. military of stealing 
personal items from Noriega’s offices that were reportedly being sold in the 
United States.36  They argued that such conduct was “reminiscent of ancient 
 
29  Id.; see also United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 1997) (“In 
pre-trial proceedings, the government offered to stipulate that Noriega had received 
approximately $320,000 from the United States Army and the Central Intelligence Agency. 
Noriega insisted that the actual figure approached $10,000,000.”). 
30  LeMoyne, supra note 27. 
31  Id. 
32  John Otis, Magistrate Accuses U.S. of Obstructing Justice, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 
13, 1990. 
33  LeMoyne, supra note 27 (quoting Charles S. Saphos, then Chief of the Justice 
Department’s narcotics division, stating, “We have heard a bunch of rumors to that effect, 
but we have not been able to substantiate any of them.”). 
34  Defendant’s Emergency Motion for Inventory and Inspection of All Items Seized 
from or Belonging to the Defendant Pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
16(a)(1)(C), Emergency Motion to Prevent Government from Destroying Any and All Items 
Seized from or Belonging to the Defendant, United States v. Noriega, (S.D. Fla. May 21, 
1991) (No. 88-cr-79), available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/1901.pdf; [hereinafter Jan. 
1990 Emergency Motion]. 
35  Order, United States v. Noriega, (S.D. Fla. May 21, 1991) (No. 88-cr-79), available 
at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/190.pdf. 
36  Motion for Inventory and Return of Stolen Property at 1-2, United States v. Noriega, 
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 1990) (No. 88-cr-79), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/noriegamotion.pdf. 
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times when Attila the Hun and barbarians sacked and burned cities and later 
divvied up the booty among themselves.”37 
Demands from both Noriega’s lawyers and Panamanian investigators for 
access to the documents in U.S. custody also quickly became contentious.  
Following a court order to create an inventory of the documents seized, the 
government began making certain documents available to Noriega’s 
defense counsel, but the scope of the access remained a contested issue.38 
Meanwhile, in Panama in May 1990, a Panamanian magistrate judge 
accused U.S. officials of “obstructing justice by restricting his access to 
documents he needs to investigate former associates” of Noriega.39  Shortly 
thereafter, an official from the Panamanian controller’s office reportedly 
“ordered the U.S. Army to give Panamanian auditors access to documents 
captured” in Panama and complained that, while Noriega had access to 
documents “to obtain evidence that can serve his defense,” Panama did “not 
have access to the documentation to get information and evidence to help 
the (justice) process.”40 
Ironically, at the same time the United States was withholding the 
documents from Panamanian government investigators, U.S. prosecutors in 
Noriega’s case in Miami were simultaneously questioning the authority of 
the court to order the U.S. government to retain custody of the seized 
documents.41  U.S. prosecutors invoked the political question doctrine by 
arguing that by “requiring the United States to maintain custody of the 
items seized in Panama,” the court was “impermissibly intrud[ing] on 
foreign policy matters solely within the Executive Branch.”42 
According to U.S. government filings, the U.S. government had 
previously “reached an agreement with the Vice President of Panama in 
which the United States would relinquish custody of items seized during the 
 
37  Id. 
38  In a June 1990 filing, the U.S. government noted that documents covered by court 
order had been “segregated and placed in a secure room for defense counsel’s inspection” in 
Panama. Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Enforce Compliance with 
Standing Discovery Order at 3, United States v. Miranda, (S.D. Fla. June 27, 1990) (No. 88-
cr-79), available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/690.pdf.  See also infra Part III.C. 
(discussing the scope of documents subject to this order). 
39  Otis, supra note 32. 
40  John Otis, Panama Demands Access to Noriega Records, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 
17, 1990. 
41  Order, United States v. Noriega, (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 1990) (No. 88-cr-79), available 
at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/290.pdf. 
42  Order Affirming in Part and Reserving Ruling on the Remainder of the Magistrate’s 
Ruling Requiring the Government to Retain Custody of Items Seized in Panama, United 
States v. Noriega, (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 1990) (No. 88-cr-79), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/890.pdf (ordering the government to retain documents until 
defense lawyers could review an inventory and “take any appropriate legal action to preserve 
same for use at any hearings or trial herein”) [hereinafter Aug. 1990 Order on Retention]. 
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military action to the newly constituted Panamanian government.”43  The 
agreement “arose from a number of diplomatic concerns, including respect 
for Panamanian sovereignty and a desire to minimize the United States’ 
presence in Panama.”44  Although there was no timetable for the return of 
the documents under the agreement, the government nevertheless asserted 
that any court-ordered retention of the documents “frustrates these foreign 
policy goals and ignores the rightful claims of the Panamanian government 
to the seized property.”45 
In his August 1990 decision on the issue, however, District Judge 
William Hoeveler found the government’s arguments unpersuasive, stating: 
Where, as here, the Government has chosen to arrest and prosecute the 
leader of a foreign country or de facto head of state, it is inevitable 
that foreign policy concerns will loom over many, if not all, of the 
issues raised in this case.  But the government’s legitimate desire to 
pursue diplomatic goals cannot be considered to the exclusion of a 
criminal defendant’s rights . . . [T]he judicial branch’s lack of 
jurisdiction over foreign policy matters properly committed to the 
political sphere of government does not then too divest the Court of 
jurisdiction to protect the interests of a criminal defendant standing 
before it.46 
By Summer 1990, disappointed U.S. government officials reportedly 
admitted that they had “found almost no documents . . . that conclusively 
prove[d] General Noriega trafficked in drugs.”47  According to a 
contemporaneous account by the New York Times, “a six-month review of 
tens of thousands of captured documents has turned up no evidence of drug 
dealing by General Noriega, according to three American officials closely 
informed of the painstaking review of documents by several American 
agencies.”48  An American official in Panama at the time, however, simply 
attributed the lack of a “smoking gun” to the fact that “Noriega was smart 
enough not to put anything on paper.”49 
B. Demands & Offers to Return the Documents 
Once the U.S. government had completed its initial review of the 
 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  LeMoyne, supra note 27 (noting that the result conflicted with U.S. government 
expectations that there would be “a damning paper trail of incriminating documents among 
General Noriega’s private and official papers”). 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
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documents, it began to expand Panamanian officials’ access, although the 
documents remained in tight U.S. control.50  A July 25, 1990 State 
Department cable, for example, authorized the U.S. Embassy in Panama to 
establish a “fixed procedure” that would allow limited access to specific 
Panamanian prosecutors and magistrates and would document in detail 
“access to every document” on the basis that prosecutors in Noriega’s case 
in Miami would have to “explain the procedures to the court and assure that 
the procedures have been followed.”51  The cable further required that the 
procedures must indicate that access to the documents was provided to 
Panamanian prosecutors for “investigative purposes only” and “not for 
publication or the like.”52 
Once Panamanian officials were allowed more extensive access to the 
documents, however, they began to confront the negative consequences of 
that access.  In an August 1990 press conference, Panamanian President 
Guillermo Endara announced the formation of an “ad hoc commission 
made up of Panamanian clergy” that would undertake a review of the 
documents and “decide which documents should be turned over to 
government ministries for investigations” and “which documents on private 
citizens gathered by Noriega’s intelligence service will be destroyed.”53  
President Endara later noted that he chose “clergymen because he figured 
they would keep the secrets contained in the boxes.”54  The ad hoc 
commission, however, “dissolved itself before it started to work,” 
reportedly due to the fact that “some sensitive G-2 [intelligence] documents 
already had disappeared, and the priests feared they would be accused of 
leaking them if they appeared in the press.”55 
Despite the concerns of the Panamanian government about the records, 
prosecutors in Noriega’s case continued to assert that the Panamanian 
government was repeatedly requesting custody of the documents.56  U.S. 
 
50  Cable from Dep’t of State Regarding Captured Documents (July 25, 1990) (on file 
with George H.W. Bush Presidential Library), National Security Council Records, William 
T. Pryce, Panama (Seized Documents File), available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/790.pdf 
[hereinafter Cable from Dep’t of State]; Otis, supra note 32 (noting how after “three months 
of waiting,” an auditor was finally allowed to access the documents “but U.S. military 
officials refused to give him unrestricted access to the boxes”). 
51  See Cable from Dep’t of State. 
52  Id. By August 1990, the U.S. government had expanded access to the government of 
Panama to the extent that a Panamanian magistrate stated that, while the documents 
continued to “be guarded by the U.S. military at a secret site,” they were essentially 
“controlled by Panama.”  Otis, supra note 18.  Based on later events, this statement appears 
to have been an overstatement. 
53  Otis, supra note 18. 
54  Oppenheimer, supra note 5. 
55  Id. 
56  Government’s Response to Defendant’s Request that this Court Order the United 
States to Continue to Retain Custody Over Items Seized in Panama at 2, United States v. 
2014] THE LOST ARCHIVES OF NORIEGA 67 
prosecutors stated in court filings: “[t]he current Government of Panama 
needs these records to operate an orderly Government,” and “[t]he United 
States Government has been attempting to comply with the Government of 
Panama’s request that they be returned to the proper record custodians.”57 
When the United States was finally prepared to return custody of the 
documents to Panama following Noriega’s trial, however, the Panamanian 
government reportedly balked.  In January 1993, the Miami Herald 
published an article aptly titled “Political Hot Potato Sits in Panama 
Warehouse.”58  According to the piece, President Endara stated that he 
would “not seek to recover up to 15,000 boxes of secret documents seized 
by U.S. troops during the 1989 invasion because they contain sensitive files 
about the sexual activities of scores of prominent citizens.”59  President 
Endara was quoted as saying that “[t]hose boxes spell trouble” and that 
“[y]ellow journalists would have a field day with them.”60  The article 
reported, “U.S. officials have told the Panamanian government that Panama 
can have access to the boxes as soon as it wants. Panama had replied that 
it’s in no hurry to take them over.”61  The article concluded, 
Now the boxes remain in U.S. military custody and in a legal limbo, 
Panamanian and U.S. officials say. U.S. diplomats say they most 
likely will be turned over to Panama before U.S. troops leave Panama 
as scheduled by the end of 1999, but it’s unclear whether they will 
change hands anytime soon.62 
For years, the 1993 Miami Herald account remained the final public 
report on the fate of the documents.  An internal National Archives and 
Records Administration (“NARA”) memorandum from July 1995, recently 
made public via the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), continued the 
story noting that the U.S. Army had informed NARA that it had “offered to 
return the original documents” to the government of Panama, but that 
Panama had “not yet responded and Army cannot predict when a response 
will be forthcoming.”63  The Army therefore requested NARA’s assistance 
in developing a contingency plan for possibly transferring custody of the 
documents either to NARA or the U.S. Army Center for Military History.64 
 
Noriega, (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 1990) (No. 88-cr-79), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/990.pdf. 
57  Id. 
58  Oppenheimer, supra note 5. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  July 1995 Moore Memo, supra note 3. 
64  Id.; Memorandum from Jimmie C. Simpkins, Colonel, Deputy Commander – 
Support, U.S. Army South, to Jerry Nashorn, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. (May 5, 
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At some point thereafter in either 1995 or 1998, the thousands of boxes 
of original captured documents were transported to the United States and 
placed in storage in the Defense Distribution Depot in Albany, Georgia.65  
It appears that the boxes were then largely forgotten until an inquiry by the 
Panama Truth Commission. 
Established by a January 18, 2001 Presidential decree, the Panama Truth 
Commission, or Comisión de la Verdad de Panamá, was empowered to 
“investigate human rights violations perpetrated during the military 
dictatorships of Generals Omar Torrijos and Manuel Noriega between 1968 
and 1989.”66  Given the importance of the Noriega regime documents to 
this work, the Truth Commission sought to locate the documents seized by 
U.S. forces.  After initial inquiries to Panamanian military and policy 
authorities and the U.S. Embassy led to “unsatisfactory results,” the Truth 
Commission “unofficially” received information from an unknown source 
indicating that the documents may be located in a U.S. military 
installation.67 
The Truth Commission, thereafter, repeatedly sought to access the 
documents in U.S. custody.68  In February 2002, however, the State 
Department informed the Truth Commission by letter that the seized 
documents remained in the custody of the U.S. Army.  If the Truth 
Commission wanted to obtain access, it would have to submit FOIA 
requests, a right no greater than that afforded to any member of the general 
 
2010), http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/595.pdf (requesting NARA’s “assistance and input to 
develop a concept plan for transferring JUST CAUSE documents to your organization”). 
65  Compare Rayburn Memo, supra note 6, at 1 (“[C]aptured records from Operation 
Just Cause had been stored at the [Defense Department] facility since 1995,”), with Isaac 
Hampton, U.S. Army South Command Historian, Timeline of Operation Just Cause Records, 
Oct. 10, 2011, at 4, available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/1011.pdf [hereinafter Dr. 
Hampton Draft Report] (stating that the storage agreement and the transfer of the documents 
to Georgia took place in 1998).  The exact circumstances surrounding the transfer of the 
documents to Georgia remain unclear.  According to recent investigations by NARA, the 
agreement to store the documents at the defense depot in Georgia was signed by the Center 
for Military History, rather than U.S. Army South, although the latter has been responsible 
for the records.  Rayburn Memo, supra note 6, at 1.  One possible explanation is that, 
according to an unrelated report by the Center for Military History in 1997, there was limited 
storage space available for Army equipment in the mid-1990s due to the downsizing of the 
Army, post closures, and “unit inactivations.”  CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY, REFLAGGING 
IN THE ARMY 9 (1997).  As a result, the Army began using the depot in Georgia for 
temporary storage, although due to “an agreement with Defense Department officials in 
Albany to keep activity at a minimum, the Army property there was to be treated as ‘dead 
storage,’” which meant that the Center for Military History “was not able to verify what was 
in storage at Albany, and inquiries by units as to the location of their property could not be 
answered.”  Id. 
66  Truth Commission: Panama, supra note 7. 
67  COMISION DE LA VERDAD, supra note 8. 
68  Id. 
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public.69  While the Truth Commission considered it an achievement to 
simply verify the continued existence of the documents, the U.S. 
government failed to make them available to the Truth Commission to help 
it unearth evidence of human rights violations perpetrated by the Noriega 
regime.70 
C. Resurrecting Boxes from Dead Storage 
In 2010, more than a decade after the boxes were placed in storage in 
Georgia, the existence of the collection suddenly reemerged as a result of an 
enterprising archivist and a $64,000 bill.71  In 2010, librarians at the 
Foreign Military Studies Office (“FMSO”) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
were considering what do with a collection of microfilm rolls.72  In 
investigating the provenance of the collection with the assistance of an 
archivist from NARA, the archivist determined that the collection consisted 
of microfilm copies of the seized Noriega regime documents that were on 
loan from the DIA.  During this process, the NARA archivist also located 
references to the original hard copy documents in a 2001 Defense 
Department memorandum that noted that “over six million pages of 
Panamanian documents” were “currently stored in 9131 boxes at the 
Defense Distribution Depot in Albany, GA.”73  A February 2010 email 
from the NARA archivist asked, “[S]hould NARA begin inquiring about 
the status of the 9,000+ boxes of war records from Panama reportedly being 
stored in the Defense Distribution Depot in GA?”74 
Not long afterward, the Commander of U.S. Army South, the unit that 
had been responsible for the records, unexpectedly received a bill for 
$64,000 from the Depot in Georgia for ten years of past fees incurred for 
storing the documents.75  The Commander of U.S. Army South then tasked 
the unit’s historian with investigating the stored materials and finding a 
long-term solution for their disposition.76 
NARA, U.S. Army South, the DIA, and the State Department have 
subsequently been attempting to unravel the legal and diplomatic puzzle of 
the legal status of these records and determining what to do with them.77 
 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  U.S. Army South Command Historian, supra note 65, at 5. 
72  E-mail from Karen Shaw, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., to Jerome Nashorn, 
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. (Feb. 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/210.pdf. 
73  Feith Memo, supra note 19, at 1. 
74  E-mail from Karen Shaw, supra note 72. 
75  Dr. Hampton Draft Report, supra note 65, at 5. 
76  Id. 
77  See, e.g., “Operation Just Cause Records Disposition Teleconference,” Mar. 23, 2011 
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III.  THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NORIEGA FILES 
The central question for the U.S. government’s analysis is whether the 
original documents seized during Operation Just Cause remain the property 
of the government of Panama or whether they are now U.S. federal records.  
Specifically, the U.S. Army appears prepared to treat the seized documents 
as U.S. Army records, considering them “documents captured or 
confiscated in wartime by international law.”78 
The seemingly straightforward questions of whether the Noriega regime 
documents were “captured” or “confiscated” during Operation Just Cause 
and who owns them are, in fact, complicated by several factors.  First, the 
standards governing document seizures under the law of armed conflict 
may vary depending upon whether Operation Just Cause is classified as an 
international or non-international armed conflict, a classification for which 
there is conflicting evidence.79  Second, the status of the documents as U.S. 
federal records may be affected by post-seizure diplomatic discussions and 
other developments, details of which remain non-public.  Third, the legal 
status of the records may also vary with the nature of individual documents, 
with the result that some may constitute Panamanian property, U.S. 
property, or personal property of General Noriega. 
A. Law of Armed Conflict 
The first issue to consider is the classification of Operation Just Cause as 
either an international or non-international armed conflict and the possible 
consequences of that classification for the legal status of seized records. 
1. Seized Documents in an International Armed Conflict 
In many respects, Operation Just Cause appeared to be a traditional 
international armed conflict.  The armed forces of one state, the United 
States, engaged in hostilities against the armed forces of another state, 
Panama.80  Additionally, following Noriega’s conviction in 1992, District 
 
(involving representatives from NARA, U.S. Army South, and the DIA), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/311.pdf; 2011 State Dep’t/U.S. Army Teleconference, supra 
note 24. 




79  See, e.g., GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 169 (2010) (using Operation Just Cause as an example of the 
difficulty of classifying armed conflicts); John E. Parkerson, United States Compliance with 
Humanitarian Law Respecting Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133 MIL. L. REV. 31, 
41-43 (1991) (describing the difficulty of classifying Operation Just Cause). 
80  See PHILLIPS, supra note 11, at 44 (summarizing the conflict and providing estimates 
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Judge William Hoeveler adjudicated whether the United States had to treat 
Noriega as a prisoner-of-war under the 1949 Geneva Conventions during 
his incarceration.81  In doing so, Judge Hoeveler expressed little doubt 
about the issue of the classification of Operation Just Cause, holding that 
“what occurred” in Panama “in late-1989 – early-1990 was clearly an 
‘armed conflict’ within the meaning of Article 2” of the Geneva 
Conventions and noting that “[a]rmed troops intervened in a conflict 
between two parties to the treaty.”82  Judge Hoeveler’s determination relied 
upon not only the text of the Geneva Conventions, but also the expressed 
policy of the United States “that Article 2 of the Conventions should be 
construed liberally.”83 
If U.S. operations in Panama were part of an Article 2 international 
armed conflict, the full body of the law of armed conflict would apply to 
those operations and the seizure of the Noriega regime documents would 
implicate the complicated set of rules that apply to enemy documents 
“captured” or “confiscated” in armed conflict.84 
In general, the law of armed conflict provides that the lawfulness of the 
seizure of enemy property depends upon the presence of military necessity 
or whether such property constitutes a “military objective.”85  Subject to 
this restriction, not only may belligerents seize enemy documents, but the 
laws of war provide that lawfully captured enemy moveable property 
generally becomes the property of the capturing state as “war booty.”86  
 
of United States military and Panama Defense Forces casualties). 
81  United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see also Geoffrey S. 
Corn & Sharon G. Finegan, America’s Longest Held Prisoner of War: Lessons Learned from 
the Capture, Prosecution, and Extradition of General Manuel Noriega, 71 LA. L. REV. 1111, 
1115 (2011). 
82  United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 795 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
83  Id. 
84  See Douglas Cox, Archives and Records in Armed Conflict: International Law and 
the Current Debate Over Iraqi Records and Archives, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 1001, 1016-1020 
(2010) (describing the legal standards governing the seizure of documents during an armed 
conflict). 
85  Under Geneva Protocol I, military objectives are “those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.”  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, at art. 52. 
86  War booty is defined as consisting “principally of governmental enemy property.”  
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT 247 (2d ed. 2010) (noting how “[i]n conformity with customary international law, 
title to any movable public property belonging to the enemy State and captured on the 
battlefield is acquired automatically by the Belligerent Party whose armed forces have seized 
it . . .” regardless of the property’s military character). 
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“Public property captured or seized from the enemy,” the U.S. Army Field 
Manual summarizes, “as well as private property validly captured on the 
battlefield and abandoned property, is the property of the United States.”87 
Government documents, however, represent a unique form of “enemy” 
property, given that they can have administrative, historical, military, 
intelligence, and even cultural value.  The 1954 Hague Convention on the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, for 
example, includes “archives” within its protections for “cultural property,” 
although the protections remain subject to a waiver in the case of 
imperative military necessity.88 
In practice, the treatment of foreign documents seized by U.S. forces 
during international armed conflicts has been inconsistent.  During World 
War II, for example, the United States internally debated whether 
documents seized in Germany had converted into U.S. property under the 
law of armed conflict.89  Ultimately, the United States asserted that title to 
at least a portion of the documents had passed to the United States and their 
return to Germany was characterized as a “donation” that required 
congressional approval.90  Similar debates took place within the 
government in relation to seized Japanese records.91  More recently, Iraqi 
documents seized by U.S. forces during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 
were treated as U.S. property and as U.S. federal records.92  In contrast, 
 
87  DEP’T OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 150 (1956); 
see also INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S 
SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 42 (Andrew Gillman & William Johnson, eds., 
2012) (“When required by military necessity, confiscated property becomes the property of 
the capturing state”) [hereinafter 2012 OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK]; cf. 50 U.S.C. § 
2204(4) (2012) (defining “spoils of war” as “enemy movable property lawfully captured, 
seized, confiscated, or found which has become United States property in accordance with 
the laws of war”). 
88  Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, at art. 1, art. 4. 
89  See ASTRID M. ECKERT, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FILES: THE WESTERN ALLIES AND 
THE RETURN OF GERMAN ARCHIVES AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR 179-85 (2012). 
90  U.S. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., General Records Schedule, Seized German 
Records, Job No. II-NNA-777 (Aug. 1, 1953), U.S. Nat’l Archives, Record Group 242, 
AGAR-S No. 3144, available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/3144.pdf. 
91  See Greg Bradsher, A “Constantly Recurring Irritant,” Returning Captured and 
Seized Japanese Records, 1946-1961, in RESEARCHING JAPANESE WAR CRIMES 169, 175 
(Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group 
ed., 2006) (describing a debate over whether the law of armed conflict provided only the 
“right to custody and use” of seized Japanese records or whether title to the records had 
passed). 
92  See Request for Records Disposition Authority from Def. Intelligence Agency to 
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin, SF 115, Job. No. N1-373-02-3, (approved Aug. 9, 2002) 
available at http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/schedules/departments/department-
of-defense/defense-agencies/rg-0373/n1-373-02-003_sf115.pdf (scheduling original hard 
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however, during the war in Vietnam, which the U.S. government treated as 
an international armed conflict,93 the U.S. government took the position that 
“enemy documents captured in the Republic of Vietnam are legally the 
property of the Vietnamese government.”94 
2. Seized Documents in a Non-International Armed Conflict 
Whether the United States “captured” or “confiscated” the Noriega 
regime documents under the law of armed conflict is further complicated by 
the fact that the U.S. executive branch has consistently taken the position 
that Operation Just Cause was not an international armed conflict.95  The 
executive branch’s view is that Operation Just Cause was not part of a 
conflict between Panama and the United States, but rather U.S. forces were 
intervening at the request of the legitimate government of Panama in an 
internal conflict against anti-government insurgent forces loyal to 
Noriega.96 
 
copies of seized documents from Iraq). 
93  See, e.g., John Norton Moore, The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic 
of Vietnam, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1967) (arguing that the United States was assisting in the 
collective defense of the Republic of Vietnam against the “unlawful armed attack” from the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which were “separate international entities”).  At the time 
there was a lively debate among international law scholars as to whether the war in Vietnam 
was an international armed conflict between North and South Vietnam, as the U.S. 
government asserted, or a civil war within one Vietnam.  See Wolfgang Friedmann, Law and 
Politics in the Vietnamese War, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 776 (1967) (responding to John Norton 
Moore’s article); John Norton Moore, Law and Politics in the Vietnamese War: A Response 
to Professor Friedmann, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 1039 (1967). 
94  U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM, MACV J2 STUDY OF THE 
EXPLOITATION OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS IN SVN 15 (1968); see also JOSEPH A. 
MCCHRISTIAN, VIETNAM STUDIES: THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 1965-1967 39 
(1994) (stating that seized original documents “were the legal property of the Republic of 
Vietnam”).  But see Morrison v. United States, 492 F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (Ct. Cl. 1974) 
(holding that enemy currency seized in Vietnam had converted into U.S. property under the 
laws of war). 
95  Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the 
Department of Defense, (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-
laws-taliban-detainees.pdf at 26 [hereinafter 2002 OLC Memo] (stating that intervention in 
Panama was not an international armed conflict); see also INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, 
U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 82 n.24 (2005) 
(stating that “the U.S. official position was Panama was not an Article 2 conflict”) 
[hereinafter 2005 LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK]; Parkerson, supra note 79, at 41 (stating that 
“[a]t first glance, it may appear ludicrous to contend” that U.S. operations in Panama “could 
be characterized as anything but ‘international,’” but that international humanitarian law may 
well treat Panama as a non-international armed conflict). 
96  See generally Parkerson, supra note 79 (examining conflict status for Operation Just 
Cause).  To confuse things further, the U.S. Army’s Law of War Handbook also previously 
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The U.S. position relies upon the executive branch’s use of the 
recognition power.  That is, while Noriega may have been the de facto head 
of Panama, the United States never formally recognized the Noriega regime 
as the legitimate government of Panama.97  Instead, the United States 
aligned itself with Guillermo Endara, who had been elected President of 
Panama several months earlier in an election that the Noriega regime had 
nullified.98  Shortly before U.S. forces engaged Noriega’s forces as part of 
Operation Just Cause, Endara was sworn in as the President of Panama on a 
U.S. military base.99  The United States then recognized his government as 
the legitimate government of Panama.100  President Endara, in turn, invited 
U.S. forces to intervene in Panama on its behalf.101  According to the State 
Department Legal Adviser at the time, “Every action taken after the arrival 
of U.S. forces was with the approval of President Endara.”102 
The U.S. government’s position, therefore, was that the United States 
was assisting the Panamanian government in a non-international armed 
conflict, for which only the more basic provisions of Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions would apply.103  This position allowed the United 
 
classified Operation Just Cause using a separate, but now discontinued, rubric of military 
doctrine, as a “military operation other than war” to which the “[t]raditional law of war 
regimes do not technically apply.”  2005 LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 95, at 242. 
97  United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1990); 2002 OLC 
Memo, supra note 95 at 26 (stating that the United States did not recognize Noriega as 
“Panama’s legitimate ruler”). 
98  2005 LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 95, at 82 n.24 (noting that the U.S. 
position was that “the legitimate Government of Panama invited us to assist them in 
reestablishing control of Panama after General Noriega nullified the free elections where Mr. 
Endara was elected President.”). 
99  See id. (“[C]oncurrent with the invasion, Mr. Endara was sworn in as President of 
Panama in the U.S. Southern Command Headquarters one hour before the invasion occurred; 
forces were already airborne en route.”). 
100  See id. (referring to Mr. Endara’s government as the “legitimate Government of 
Panama”). 
101  See President Bush Letter to Speaker, supra note 10, at 1734 (“In the early morning 
of December 20, 1989, the democratically elected Panamanian leadership announced 
formation of a government, assumed power in a formal swearing-in ceremony, and 
welcomed the assistance of U.S. Armed Forces in removing the illegitimate Noriega 
regime.”); 2005 LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 95, at 82 n.24 (“[C]oncurrent with the 
invasion, Mr. Endara was sworn in as President of Panama in the U.S. Southern Command 
Headquarters one hour before the invasion occurred; forces were already airborne en 
route.”). 
102  The Panamanian Revolution: Diplomacy, War and Self-Determination in Panama 
(I&II) Self-Determination and Intervention in Panama (I), 84 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW 
PROC. 182, 188 (1990) (statement of Abraham Sofaer, State Department Legal Adviser). 
103  See Parkerson, supra note 79, at 42 (stating that for the situation in which the 
foreign state intervenes on behalf of the established government and against the insurgents or 
rebels, the traditional answer is that “the conflict ‘remains non-international,’ and common 
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States initially to avoid granting Noriega formal status as a prisoner-of-war 
and to deny that it was obligated to fulfill the responsibilities of an 
occupying power.  A 1990 legal memorandum from W. Hays Parks to the 
Judge Advocate General of the Army, for example, asserted: 
Inasmuch as there was a regularly constituted government in Panama 
in the course of JUST CAUSE, and U.S. forces were deployed in 
support of that government, the Geneva Conventions did not apply . . . 
nor did the U.S. at any time assume the role of an occupying power as 
that term is used in the Geneva Conventions.104 
Judge Hoeveler’s subsequent rejection of the government’s position and 
his findings that Operation Just Cause was an Article 2 international armed 
conflict and that Noriega was a prisoner-of-war did not alter the view of the 
executive branch.  A 2002 Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel 
(“OLC”) memorandum on the legal status of detained members of the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda cited Panama as an example of a conflict to which the 
full provisions of the Geneva Conventions did not apply, reasserting that: 
[I]n the view of the executive branch, the conflict was between the 
Government of Panama assisted by the United States on the one side 
and insurgent forces loyal to General Noriega on the other.  It was not 
an international armed conflict between the United States and Panama, 
another State.  Accordingly, it was not, in the executive’s judgment, 
an international armed conflict governed by common article 2 of the 
Geneva Conventions.105 
The 2002 OLC memorandum also expressly noted and rejected Judge 
Hoeveler’s 1992 decision, stating: 
To the extent that the holding assumed that the courts are free to 
determine whether a conflict is between the United States and another 
“State” regardless of the President’s view whether the other party is a 
“State” or not, we disagree with it.  By assuming the right to 
determine that the United States was engaged in an armed conflict 
with Panama – rather than with insurgent forces in rebellion against 
the recognized and legitimate Government of Panama – the district 
court impermissibly usurped the recognition power, a constitutional 
 
Article 3 determines the extent of application of humanitarian law”). 
104  2005 LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 95, at 242 (quoting Memorandum from 
W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant for Law of War Matters, to the Judge Advocate General of 
the U.S. Army (Oct. 1, 1990)).  A copy of the quoted W. Hays Parks memorandum regarding 
Operation Just Cause is unfortunately no longer available in the U.S. Army’s records as 
explained in the FOIA response letter available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/Parksmemo.pdf. 
105  2002 OLC Memo, supra note 95, at 26. 
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authority reserved to the President.106 
The treatment of Operation Just Cause as a non-international armed 
conflict complicates the analysis of the status of the Noriega regime 
documents.  The central issue becomes whether seized property can be 
confiscated as war booty during a non-international armed conflict. 
The basic provisions of Common Article 3 that apply during non-
international armed conflicts do not delineate any guidance on the legal 
status of seized property.  Moreover, according to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, customary international legal standards 
governing the issue of war booty in non-international armed conflicts have 
not yet been established.107  Standards that would be relevant to such seized 
property, however, would include the domestic law of the state within 
whose borders the conflict occurred.  Domestic law might apply differently 
depending upon which side is seizing property. 
Consider, for example, two hypotheticals, one in which anti-government 
forces seize government property, and the other in which the government 
seizes property of anti-government forces.  Common Article 3 neither 
prohibits nor expressly authorizes either of these seizures.  Under the 
domestic law of the state, however, the government could prosecute anti-
government forces for the “theft” of government property in the same way 
that anti-government forces in a non-international armed conflict can be 
 
106  Id. at 26-27 n.101.  The OLC memo ignores that Judge Hoeveler expressly accepted 
in an earlier decision the fact that the Executive’s decision not to recognize Noriega as 
Panama’s head of state was “binding on the Court” in denying Noriega’s claims of head of 
state immunity based on a line of cases “holding that recognition of foreign governments and 
their leaders is a discretionary foreign policy decision committed to the Executive Branch 
and thus conclusive upon the courts.”  United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 
(S.D. Fla. 1990).  The two decisions are arguably not inconsistent to the extent that Hoeveler 
was rejecting the government’s argument that the conflict could be rendered a non-
international conflict simply by recognizing Guillermo Endara as head of a government that 
had no command and control over any armed forces or other governmental entities within 
Panama. 
107  1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 174 (2005) (“With respect to non-international armed 
conflicts, no rule could be identified which would allow, according to international law, the 
seizure of military equipment belonging to an adverse party, nor was a rule found which 
would prohibit such seizure under international law.”); see also The Law of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
605, 627-28 (Dieter Fleck et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008) (stating that while “parties to an 
international armed conflict may seize military equipment belonging to an adverse party as 
war booty . . . [i]n an non-international armed conflict the seizure of such equipment is not 
regulated under international law.”); KNUT DÖRMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER 
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 465 (2002) (“[I]t must be 
emphasized that there are no specific rules of international humanitarian law allowing 
requisitions, contributions, seizure or taking of war booty in a non-international armed 
conflict.”). 
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prosecuted for engaging in hostilities against the government.108  The 
government’s seizure of the property of anti-government forces, in contrast, 
could be further enabled by domestic law powers allowing for confiscation 
and forfeiture of property used in crimes.  It would be limited only by the 
parameters of domestic law protections (such as government “takings” 
restrictions109) and, perhaps in extreme cases, human rights standards 
governing the right to property (such as the American Convention on 
Human Rights110). 
Moreover, as a practical matter, in non-international armed conflicts in 
which control over the central government is at issue, the status of seized 
government property, including documents, will often resolve itself.  
Government records seized by anti-government forces seeking to overthrow 
the government, for example, may be recovered and re-incorporated into the 
records of the central government in the event the insurgency is defeated.  
In the alternative, if insurgent forces prevail in overthrowing the 
government, government records seized by insurgent forces during the 
conflict may be incorporated into the records of the new government as the 
successor to the old. 
The complicating factor in the situation of Operation Just Cause is the 
intervention of U.S. forces in the internal conflict in Panama.  That is, the 
question becomes to what extent the U.S. characterization of Operation Just 
Cause as an intervention in a non-international armed conflict to assist the 
government of Panama – at its request – in defeating anti-government 
forces alters the effect of property seizures by U.S. forces.  From the 
technical perspective of the law of armed conflict, the answer would be the 
same: only Common Article 3 would apply.  As discussed above, Common 
Article 3 would neither empower nor prohibit seizures of property, but the 
property would remain, in theory, subject to Panamanian domestic law. 
More specifically, a practical analysis of the effect of the seizure of 
Noriega regime documents by U.S. forces is both clearer and more 
persuasive.  That is, to the extent U.S. forces were seizing documents from 
Panamanian government facilities – even under the “illegitimate” control of 
the Noriega regime – asserting that those seizures would constitute 
“captured” or “confiscated” property to which title would pass to the U.S. 
government would effectively mean that the United States was divesting 
ownership of government records from the “legitimate” Panamanian 
government that it was purporting to assist. 
 
108  See, e.g., SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT 243 (2012) (noting that members of armed groups in non-international armed 
conflicts “remain subject to domestic criminal law and may be prosecuted for taking part in 
the hostilities”). 
109  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 6. 
110  See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 
21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
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This analysis also appears consistent with U.S. guidance on the 
distinction between Article 2 international armed conflicts and non-
international armed conflicts in which a host nation government invites 
U.S. forces into its territory.  The U.S. Army’s 2012 Operational Law 
Handbook, for example, discusses an “Article 2 Threshold” for the 
application of the property confiscation rules of the law of armed 
conflict.111  “If a host nation government invites U.S. forces into its 
territory,” the Handbook states, “the territory is not occupied, and U.S. 
forces have no right” to confiscate property because the law of armed 
conflict “and the property rules therein have not been triggered.”112 
Treating the records as Panamanian government property is also 
consistent with the initial position of the U.S. government in Noriega’s 
criminal case.113  The U.S. government never asserted legal ownership over 
the seized records and stated that the U.S. and Panamanian government had 
agreed that the United States would return the documents to the government 
of Panama.114 
 
111  2012 OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 87, at 43. 
112  Id. U.S. views on these issues are complicated by the U.S. military policy of 
applying the law of armed conflict even during operations in which it may not technically 
apply.  See DEP’T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM § 4 (May 
9, 2006) (stating that “it is DoD policy that [m]embers of the DoD Components comply with 
the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in 
all other military operations.”) (emphasis added).  During Operation Just Cause, for 
example, the State Department Legal Advisor issued a letter addressing the status and 
treatment of individuals detained during operations in Panama and argued that the fact that 
the Geneva Conventions did not technically apply was largely irrelevant, because, as a 
matter of U.S. policy, it was treating all detainees from operations in Panama as if they were 
prisoners-of-war.  Such a policy is designed to provide consistency and avoid confusion 
during military operations and, in many situations, the policy may provide both clearer 
guidance to U.S. forces and enhanced protections for civilians and combatants.  In the 
context of seizures of property, including documents, however, such a policy may confuse 
the legal status of such property.  In particular, as discussed above, under the law of armed 
conflict, property seized by U.S. forces can be converted into U.S. property as “war booty.”  
Applying such standards as policy in all U.S. military operations, however, regardless of 
whether the law of armed conflict is applicable and regardless of the role of the host nation 
in the U.S. operation, might cause confusion about U.S. ownership over seized records. Cf. 
Andrew R. Atkins, Doctrinally Accounting for Host Nation Sovereignty During U.S. 
Counterinsurgency Security Operations, 212 MIL. L. REV. 70, 71-72 (2012) (arguing that 
U.S. counterinsurgency policy continues to apply “conventional targeting, intelligence, and 
tactical methods” and fails to adequately reflect the “primacy of a host nation’s domestic” 
law in “non-international armed conflicts in which U.S. forces support a sovereign host 
nation government”). 
113  See Aug. 1990 Order on Retention, supra note 35 at 2-3 (citing the “rightful claims 
of the Panamanian government to the seized property”). 
114  Id. 
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B. U.S. Federal Records Laws 
Concluding that title to the seized documents did not transfer to the 
United States under the law of armed conflict as war booty is not 
dispositive of the related, but separate, issue of whether the documents may 
nevertheless constitute U.S. federal records. 
As an initial matter, it is important to recognize that there is unequivocal 
evidence that the U.S. Army did not initially treat the seized documents as 
federal records.  A January 1995 NARA memorandum noted that NARA 
had “been in touch with the Department of the Army General Counsel’s 
Office concerning the status” of the seized Panamanian records.  The 
memorandum noted: 
The Army General Counsel has taken the position that the documents 
are not subject to the Federal Records Act because they were not made 
or received by the Army.  Rather, there was a diplomatic 
understanding between the Government of Panama and the U.S. 
Government that the documents were to be loaned to the U.S. and 
returned to the Government of Panama.  For this reason, none of the 
documents were incorporated into Department of Army files.115 
That the seized documents were not originally considered U.S. federal 
records is clear.  Moreover, this was the understanding of NARA when then 
Archivist of the United States, John W. Carlin, wrote to the Secretary of 
Defense urging the Department of Defense (“DOD”) at the beginning of the 
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq to treat original captured Iraqi documents as 
Iraqi property.116  Archivist Carlin specifically noted that “[t]his was the 
approach that the Department of Defense used, and NARA endorsed, for 
records obtained during Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989.”117  The 
more complicated question is whether other events may have changed this 
analysis. 
Under the statutes collectively known as the Federal Records Act, 
“records” is defined broadly to include, in relevant part: 
All books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or 
other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or 
characteristics, made or received by an agency of the United States 
Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction 
of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by 
 
115  Memorandum from James W. Moore, Asst. Archivist for Records Admin., Nat’l 
Archives Records Admin. to Acting Archivist of the United States (Jan. 11, 1995),  available 
at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/195.pdf. 
116  Letter from John W. Carlin, Archivist of the United States, to Donald H. Rumsfeld, 
U.S. Sec’y of Def., at 1 (April 17, 2003), available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/17.pdf 
[hereinafter Carlin Letter]. 
117  Id. 
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that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, 
functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other 
activities of the Government or because of the informational value of 
data in them.118 
The standard for what constitutes a federal record has been fleshed out 
most frequently in the context of litigation under FOIA about the meaning 
of “agency records,” which is particularly pertinent given that courts have 
held that documents that satisfy the standard for agency records under 
FOIA are also records subject to the Federal Records Act.119  In general, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has held in the FOIA context that to qualify as an 
“agency record” an agency (1) must either “create or obtain” the record, and 
(2) must be in “control” of the records at the time of the FOIA request.120 
The “create or obtain” element roughly corresponds to the “made or 
received” language of the statutory definition of records.121  NARA 
regulations expressly note the ambiguity of whether seized documents are 
“received” by an agency by stating that “[a]dvice of legal counsel should be 
sought regarding the ‘record’ status of loaned or seized materials.”122  As 
described above, the initial view of the Army General Counsel was that the 
seized Panamanian documents were not “received” by the Army. 
In relation to the element of “control,” the U.S. Supreme Court has noted 
in the FOIA context that “[b]y control we mean that the materials have 
come into the agency’s possession in the legitimate conduct of its official 
duties.”123  Lower courts have further expanded the concept of “control” 
based on four factors: 
[1] the intent of the document’s creator to retain or relinquish control 
over the records, . . . [2] the ability of the agency to use and dispose of 
the record as it sees fit, . . . [3] the extent to which agency personnel 
have read or relied upon the document, . . . and [4] the degree to which 
the document was integrated into the agency’s record system or 
 
118  44 U.S.C. § 3301 (2011). 
119  See, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 592 F. Supp. 2d 111, 124 (D.D.C. 2009) (“It follows, then, that the records 
at issue here – having been found by this Court to be subject to FOIA – are ‘federal records’ 
subject to the FRA.”). 
120  U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1989). 
121  44 U.S.C. § 3301 (2006). 
122  36 C.F.R. § 1222.10(b)(4) (2012).  In publishing the final rule in the Federal 
Register, NARA further clarified that “received” “may or may not refer to loaned or seized 
materials depending on the conditions under which such materials came into agency custody 
or were used by the agency.”  74 Fed. Reg. §1222/10(b)(4) (Oct. 2, 2009). 
123  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 492 U.S. at 145 (noting that the Court’s treatment of “control” 
was consistent with the definition of records in 44 U.S.C. § 3301 as including documents 
“made or received by an agency . . . under Federal law or in connection with the transaction 
of public business”)  (emphasis in original). 
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files[.]124 
Applying these factors to the seized Panamanian documents helps clarify 
both what is known and what additional information is needed to make a 
determination about whether they ought to constitute U.S. federal records.  
Regarding the intent of the document creator to relinquish control over the 
records, the question becomes to what extent has Panama indicated any 
desire for the return of the documents.  The available facts include, on the 
one hand, Panama’s apparent failure to respond to U.S. offers to transfer 
custody of the original documents in approximately 1993-1994.  This could 
arguably be interpreted as abandoning or relinquishing control over the 
documents.  On the other hand, the Panamanian Truth Commission, formed 
and empowered by the Panamanian President, later expressly requested 
access to the documents, which arguably could be read as a renewed 
assertion of control.  Whether Panama has subsequently expressed any 
interest in the “rediscovered” documents and the nature of discussions, if 
any, between the U.S. State Department and Panama, is unclear. 
In relation to the second factor, the U.S. Army’s treatment of the 
documents would appear to illustrate its ability to “use and dispose” of the 
records as they see fit.  The U.S. government’s rejections of the Panama 
Truth Commission’s requests for access in 2001 are arguably an assertion 
of this control.  At the same time, the recent discussions within the U.S. 
government about how to treat the documents illustrate some uncertainty 
about whether to assert control over the documents and whether the 
government of Panama is interested in obtaining them. 
The analysis of the third and fourth factors of “control” relate to whether 
“agency personnel have read or relied upon the documents” and whether 
they have been “integrated into the agency’s record system or files” would 
appear to be clearer.125  While the U.S. Army did initially utilize and 
maintain the original records for purposes of intelligence exploitation, they 
also copied and microfilmed the records for purposes of long-term use.126  
As noted above, the U.S. Army expressly stated that it did not incorporate 
the seized documents in its files in the mid-1990s.127  Once transported to 
the United States, the documents lay sequestered and unused in storage. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, and without further information, the 
 
124  Lindsey v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 736 F.2d 1462, 1465 (11th Cir. 1984), rev’d 469 
U.S. 1082 (1984) (vacated on other grounds); Dow Jones & Co. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 714 
F. Supp. 35, 39 (D.D.C. 1989). 
125  Id. 
126  See Carlin Letter, supra note 116, at 1 (distinguishing between seized original 
records the United States intends to return, which would not be subject to the Federal 
Records Act (“FRA”), and “[c]opies of original records that you make and actively use to 
carry out agency business” that “would likely be subject to the requirements of the FRA”) 
(emphasis in original). 
127  See July 1995 Moore Memo, supra note 3, at 1. 
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argument that the seized documents have become U.S. federal records 
appears suspect. 
C. The Nature of the Documents 
A final crucial issue relevant to the foregoing discussion is that the nature 
of individual seized documents may further alter their legal status. Certain 
descriptions of the contents of the seized records include notations, for 
example, that they include some “stolen U.S. documents” to which the U.S. 
may properly assert ownership.128 
More broadly, based on available public information, the seized 
documents from Panama include at least some material that almost 
assuredly constituted personal property of General Noriega.  Partial 
inventories filed in Noriega’s U.S. criminal case, for example, disclose that 
the seized material includes, among other things, letters, photographs, 
family Christmas cards, school grades, doctors notes, and personal credit 
cards.129 
Under the law of armed conflict, the personal property of prisoners-of-
war is protected from permanent confiscation.130  This provision could 
apply to Noriega through reliance on Judge Hoeveler’s 1992 determination 
that Noriega was a prisoner-of-war, or, by analogy, based on U.S. policy of 
applying the laws of armed conflict in military operations regardless of 
whether they are technically triggered.131 
In particular, under the annexed regulations to the 1907 Hague 
Convention on the law of land warfare, for example, “personal belongings” 
of captured combatants generally remain their property except for “arms, 
horses, and military papers.”132  Similarly, the Third Geneva Convention 
provides that “[a]ll effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, 
military equipment and military documents, shall remain in the possession 
of prisoners of war.”133  Commentary by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross provides additional flavor by interpreting “military documents” 
to include “maps, regulations, written orders, plans, individual military 
 
128  1990 DIA Memo, supra note 17, at 1. 
129  See, e.g., Partial Inventory of Panamanian Materials from Specified Residences of 
Manuel Antonio Noriega at 2, United States v. Noriega 746 F.Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 
1990) (88-cr-79), available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/990.pdf. 
130  See infra notes 132-134 and accompanying text. 
131  See DEP’T OF DEFENSE DIR. 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM § 4, supra note 
112 (“DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however 
such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.”). 
132  Annex to the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 4 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 (noting that “personable belongings” remain the 
property of prisoners-of-war, “except arms, horses, and military papers”). 
133  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 18 Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. (emphasis added). 
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records, etc.”134 
The application of this distinction between the personal and the 
institutional has always been difficult to apply in practice.  During World 
War II, for example, the U.S. considered the legal status of captured diaries 
of high-ranking Nazi officials using a fact-intensive inquiry.135  Military 
lawyers determined “that if the diary was so related to the official duties of 
the writer that it might be considered as properly part of the official papers 
pertaining to the German war effort, it may properly be considered to be 
‘military papers.’”  However, “if a similar diary reflected merely the 
personal observation of the writer, it would not be considered ‘military 
papers’ and therefore must be considered private property.”136 
Determining which seized documents might constitute Noriega’s 
personal property was also the subject of litigation in his criminal case.  The 
issue arose specifically in the context of pre-trial discovery pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E), which provides in relevant 
part that “[u]pon a defendant’s request, the government must permit the 
defendant to inspect and to copy . . . papers [and] documents . . . within the 
government’s possession, custody, or control” if “the item was obtained 
from or belongs to the defendant.”137 
In January 1990, Noriega’s defense counsel filed an emergency motion 
pursuant to the Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 that demanded an “inventory and 
inspection of all items seized from the Commandancia Headquarters of the 
Panamanian Defense Forces (“PDF”), or any other location in Panama.”138  
The motion asserted that federal prosecutors had already traveled to Panama 
“for the very purpose of reviewing items seized from these locations, and 
has been in contact with United States military officials who may presently 
be in control of these items.”139 
Following a hearing, U.S. Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff granted 
Noriega’s emergency motion and ordered the government “to prepare an 
 
134  Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War  art. 18, 
construed in Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary- Art. 18. Part III.n/a, para. 1 n.4, 
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590023. 
135  William G. Downey, Captured Enemy Property: Booty of War and Seized Enemy 
Property, 44 AM. J. INT’L L. 488, 495 (1950). 
136  Id. 
137  FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E). At the time the relevant rule was FED. R. CRIM. P. 
16(a)(1)(C). 
138  Jan. 1990 Emergency Motion, supra note 35, at 1. 
139  Id. at 3.  Noriega’s attorneys further argued that the seized documents “contain 
information material to the defense” in that they “demonstrate the assistance that General 
Noriega has given to various agencies of the United States in their efforts to eradicate 
trafficking in narcotics and in other endeavors beneficial to the interests of the United 
States,” and, therefore, “the government is hereby on notice of the existence of and need to 
preserve such exculpatory evidence.”  Id. 
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inventory of items seized at the defendant’s two residences,” as well as an 
“inventory of the defendant’s military offices and those directly under his 
control.”140 
The scope of Magistrate Turnoff’s order and the scope of Noriega’s 
ownership interest in the documents thereafter became a more contentious 
issue before District Judge Hoeveler.  The government argued, for example, 
that documents seized from the headquarters of the PDF and the 
Panamanian Police Forces “do not belong to Noriega within the meaning” 
of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.141  As summarized by Judge Hoeveler, the 
government’s argument was that documents housed within “Panamanian 
government and military installations” were “the property of the 
Panamanian government” on the basis that “if Noriega had resigned his 
official position and returned to private life, there is no basis for assuming 
that official files contained in these locations would have been his to take,” 
and the government objected to the Magistrate’s order insofar as it 
“interpret[ed] official government and military documents as belonging to 
Noriega.”142 
During the hearing, Judge Hoeveler opined that the government’s 
argument “seems to make a fair amount of sense,” noting: 
It would seem to me that to draw an analogy, if the head of our Joint 
Chiefs of Staff was replaced, only a small amount of the files that 
were in his office would probably be determined to be his personal 
files.  When the new Chief of Staff came in, he would pick up the files 
that were there. . . . [W]hen someone leaves Government, depending 
upon the circumstances, of course, . . . a lot of things . . . would not be 
considered his personal files, even though he may have had access to 
them and used them, but they would be files of the Government of 
Panama.143 
In contrast, Noriega’s attorneys argued that “although housed in 
government or military facilities, many of the items seized from these 
locations were his own personal files for his use only.”144 
 
140  Order on Defendant’s Emergency Motion, United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 
1506 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 1990) (No. 88-cr-79), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/190.pdf; see also Richard L. Berke, U.S. is Told to Preserve 
Noriega Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990. 
141  See Aug. 1990 Order on Retention, supra note 42, at 5. 
142  Id.  The government, for example, while noting that “naturally there are a dirth [sic] 
of cases in the area on items seized form military officers,” argued that “property of the 
institution, even though it may be used by and physically possessed by the officer” does not 
come within Rule 16.  Transcript of Hearing at 5, United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 
1506 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 1990) (No. 88-cr-79), available at 
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/p/890t.pdf [hereinafter Aug. 2, 1990 Hearing]. 
143  Id. at 7. 
144  See Aug. 1990 Order on Retention, supra note 42 at 4-5. 
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While Judge Hoeveler did not directly resolve the issue and largely held 
his ruling in abeyance, and while the issue was limited to an interpretation 
of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, the debate over the breadth of Noriega ownership 
continues to be relevant.145  The arguments and analysis were, however, 
limited in that they primarily were based on common sense assumptions 
about the distinction between personal and government records.  The debate 
largely failed to take into consideration the rich body of guidance and 
precedent in U.S. law for determining the distinction between personal 
records and federal (or presidential) records, which, while not technically 
applicable, could have provided direction, nuance, and analogy. 
There is at least a colorable argument, for example, that different rules 
might apply to the Noriega regime documents on the basis that he was the 
de facto head of state, even if he was not recognized as such by the United 
States.  While records of the U.S. President, for example, are currently the 
property of the U.S. government, this is only because of the specialized, 
and, in many respects unique, Presidential Records Act of 1978.146  Prior to 
its enactment, presidential records in the United States were considered 
personal property of the President.  And even now, the President retains 
broad authority to determine what documents constitute “presidential 
records” that are subject to the Act.147 
Moreover, U.S. law has also addressed with some regularity the 
distinction between personal records and federal records for other 
government officials.148  The practical application of these standards has 
been, at times, extremely broad.  Most famously, when former Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger left office, the Legal Adviser of the Department of 
State advised Kissinger that transcripts of telephone conversations 
conducted in his official capacity and involving substantive discussions of 
U.S. policy were nevertheless “not agency records, but were his personal 
 
145  Id. at 5. 
146  Presidential Records Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (2006). 
147  See 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (2006); see also Supplemental Declaration of Gary M. 
Stern at 3, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Nat’l Archives and 
Records Admin., 583 F.Supp.2d 146 (June 21, 2007) (No. 07-cv-48), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-
columbia/dcdce/1:2007cv00048/123882/11/1.pdf (stating that the President decides which 
records are presidential records and that NARA “has no formal role” in this “threshold 
question”). 
148  See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 492 U.S. at 145 (“[T]he term ‘agency records’ is not 
so broad as to include personal materials in an employee’s possession, even though the 
materials may be physically located at the agency.”); Bureau of Nat. Affairs, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 742 F.2d 1484, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (determining whether appointment 
books of agency employees constituted personal or agency records); NAT’L ARCHIVES & 
RECORDS ADMIN., DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL RECORDS: A RECORDS MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 
27 (1997) (describing standards for personal papers maintained within agency offices) 
available at http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/pdf/dfr-2000.pdf. 
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papers, which he would be free to take when he left office.”149 
Given the insistence of the United States that Operation Just Cause was a 
non-international armed conflict, the body of law most relevant for 
determining the precise distinction between Panamanian governmental 
records and Noriega’s personal records is the law of Panama, a thorough 
examination of which is beyond the scope of this Article and the expertise 
of its author.  Such analysis would include an examination of whether, and 
to what extent, Panamanian law makes a distinction between personal and 
government records generally.  It would also include, more specifically, 
whether Panama’s confiscation of Noriega’s property affected his 
ownership interests in the seized documents.150 
IV.  EMANCIPATING THE NORIEGA FILES 
The legal analysis above highlights the complexity of determining the 
precise legal status of the documents seized during Operation Just Cause 
and challenges any assertions by the U.S. government that the documents 
constitute U.S. property pursuant to the law of armed conflict or U.S. Army 
records pursuant to U.S. federal records laws.  The more basic and practical 
question is, in light of the uncertainty of the documents legal status, what 
should the U.S. government do with them.  Outlined below are a few 
recommendations and thoughts on resolving the question of the documents. 
As an initial matter, the U.S. government should recognize that the seized 
Panamanian documents constitute human rights documentation that 
potentially contains information about individuals whose fate still remains a 
mystery to human rights investigators and family members in Panama.  
Additionally, they could also constitute evidence, either for the prosecution 
or defense, in ongoing legal proceedings following Noriega’s recent return. 
On these bases alone, the U.S. government should treat the disposition of 
these documents as essential and time-sensitive. 
Moreover, given the “rediscovery” of the documents, simply maintaining 
the status quo by retaining custody of them may ultimately deprive the 
executive branch of the ability to make and effectuate reasonable, 
responsible, and diplomatically sound decisions about the status of the 
documents.  Issues of ownership and access may become decisions for the 
courts.  FOIA litigation following requests for access to the documents, for 
example, could bring court decisions about the status of the documents that 
might undermine the government’s own analysis and frustrate its diplomatic 
goals. 
 
149  Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 140-41 
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In resolving the legal and diplomatic issues presented by these 
documents, the most central uncertainty is the perspective of the 
government of Panama.151  Given the passage of time, the United States 
should, if it has not done so already, renew its offer to return the original 
documents to Panama.152  This act would offer several benefits. 
First, as outlined in the legal analysis above, treating the documents as 
the property of Panama is consistent with the executive branch’s view that 
U.S. forces seized the documents during a non-international armed conflict 
in which the U.S. forces intervened on behalf of the government of 
Panama.153 
Second, offering the documents to Panama would be consistent with the 
earlier understanding that the documents were only on “loan” to the United 
States.154  It would also be consistent with the earlier diplomatic agreement 
with Panama that the documents would be returned, and with the related 
legal conclusion by the Army General Counsel that the documents were not 
U.S. federal records.155 
Third, recognizing and asserting that Panama retains a legal right to these 
records would display respect for Panamanian sovereignty and may avoid 
accusations that the U.S. government is depriving Panama ownership over 
its own history, or stated less diplomatically, allegations that the United 
States has plundered Panamanian history as war booty.  There is a long and 
infamous history of controversies over the fate of government records 
displaced by armed conflict.156  There is no reason to unnecessarily create a 
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new controversy with respect to these now largely historical records.  
Ironically, what currently distinguishes the Noriega regime documents from 
more controversial collections of foreign captured documents is the silence 
of the Panamanian government. 
Finally, offering to return the documents has the related benefit of 
providing Panama with an opportunity to take responsibility for an 
important part of its history by preserving, managing, and making the 
documents accessible to its citizens and others in a responsible manner. 
If, however, despite an offer to return the documents, Panama either 
affirmatively declines or otherwise indicates an intention to relinquish their 
rights to the documents, the U.S. Army would have a more solid legal basis 
for treating the documents as its records.  The Army would also have a 
more compelling practical argument to undertake steps to properly preserve 
the documents and declassify them where necessary.  Ultimately, the 
documents could be added to the National Archives to make them available 
to researchers. 
Moreover, in order to maximize transparency and acceptance of such a 
determination to treat the original foreign records as U.S. Army records, the 
U.S. Army should not quietly classify them pursuant to the inapposite 
“captured” documents records schedule, but rather should submit a new 
proposed records schedule specific to the unique Noriega regime 
documents, notice of which NARA should publish in the Federal Register 
to provide public notice and invite public comment. 
The dangers of treating the original seized documents as Panamanian 
property and offering to return them are also navigable.  There are 
legitimate fears about what the fate of the original documents would be in 
Panama.  The record of Panama in treating its own records is less than 
encouraging.  The records of the Panama Truth Commission itself, for 
example, were subjected to theft, and their whereabouts, as of a 2005 report 
by a former acting Archivist of the United States, were unknown.157 
Such risks to the documents and the corresponding risks to other 
stakeholders in these records (including historians and human rights 
researchers in the United States) could be minimized in returning them to 
Panama.  Not only could the U.S. government create a “safety” copy of the 
original documents prior to their return, which is consistent with past U.S. 
practice, but a microfilm copy of a significant portion of the seized records 
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(if not all of them) is already in the custody of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency.158 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While many records of former repressive regimes, such as those in 
Argentina, Chile, Cambodia, and East Germany are held in special archival 
repositories or “museums of memory,” the documents of the Noriega 
regime remain to this day in a military warehouse in Georgia.  While these 
Noriega archives present a unique challenge as records that are 
simultaneously both displaced from the nation to which they pertain, but 
also not subject to any apparent, or at least public, demands by that nation 
for their return, the status quo is not an acceptable option.  The documents 
constitute a crucial part of Panamanian history, but are also a part of U.S. 
history.  Accordingly, they need to be made responsibly accessible in both 
countries. 
As with any collection of documents from a former repressive regime, 
they will undoubtedly contain information that may require legitimate 
protection from disclosure on national security or personal privacy grounds. 
Access to these documents, however, should be as broad as such 
considerations will allow.  For purposes of history, human rights, 
government accountability, and current legal proceedings in Panama 
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